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FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to 
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational 
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine 
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance 
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility 
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and 
photographic analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, 
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying 
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In 
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video 
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space 
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also 
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment 
of the mission.
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Shuttle Mission STS-53 was launched at 8:24 a.m. local 12/2/92 
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1.0 Summary 
The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 1 December 1992. The detailed walkdown of 
Launch Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the primary flight 
elements OV-103 Discovery (15th flight), ET-49 (LWT 42), and 
81-055 SRB's. There were no vehicle or facility anomalies. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 2 December 1992. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations 
with the exception of acreage ice/frost exceeding 0.0625 
inches. Delaying the launch approximately 90 minutes after 
sunrise allowed melting of the acreage ice/frost. A second ice 
inspection at T-9 minutes confirmed there was no LCC violations 
and lifted the constraint to launch. The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 
leak sensor detected no significant hydrogen leakage during the 
cryoload. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips were visible 
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. A crack that 
extended 2/3 the width of the -Y vertical strut cable tray was 
present in the forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout 
interface. Although jagged in appearance, the crack exhibited 
no offset and was not filled with ice or frost. The appearance 
of the crack was expected due to the elimination of the stress 
relief gap at the factory. The condition was acceptable for 
launch per NSTS-08303 and CR SO41254C. 
A debris inspection of Pad 39A was performed after launch. No 
flight hardware was found with the exception of one FRSI plug. 
EPON shim material on the south holddown posts was intact but 
slightly debonded. There was no visual indication of a stud 
hang-up on any of the south hoiddown posts. No frangible 
nut/ordnance fragments were found. The GH2 vent line had 
latched properly. Damage to the facility overall was minimal. 
A total of 123 film and video items were analyzed as part of 
the post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost 
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the 
mission. Numerous camera views showed that ice accumulation on 
the Orbiter side of the External Tank had melted prior to the 
time of lift off. Ice/frost covered a substantial part of the 
ET -z side LH2 tank, but was not a concern for launch. Orange 
vapor (burning hydrogen) was visible between the exit plane and 
the #9 hatband near the steer horn, or the coolant manifold, on 
the SS #2 nozzle -z side. This event is similar to the cold 
wall hydrogen leak observed during SS #2 ignition for STS-44. 
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #1. The stud remained fully 
extended until clear of the aft skirt foot, twanged briefly, 
and then dropped into the holddown post. On-orbit photography 
revealed ET structural separation from the Orbiter appeared 
nominal. The BSM burn scars on the L02 tank were typical. No 
anomalies were observed on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, PAL 
ramps, and LH2 tank.
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Six divots were visible in the aft dome spray abort. Four 
divots occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. 
Residual hydrogen was venting from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical - a 
phenomenon that has been observed on previous tanks. Film 
analysis also showed orbiter performance, landing gear exten-
sion, wheel touchdown, and vehicle rollout after landing were 
normal. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. The RH frustum had 16 MSA-2 debonds and one 1-inch 
diameter area of missing TPS between the +Y and -z axes at the 
381 ring frame. The LH frustum had 28 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners. Torn and missing MSA-2 (1-inch diameter) from one 
location between the +Y and +Z axes just aft of the 336 ring 
frame may have been the result of handling damage. Three pins 
were missing from the LH frustum severance ring, a condition 
that reportedly was the result of parachute entanglement. All 
Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated properly. 
The HDP #1 stud hole was broached due to a stud hang-up. A 
10 1Ix3" area of EPON shim was missing from HDP #3. The material 
was lost prior to water impact (sooted/charred substrate) 
A 2.75 inch long (mild radius) by 0.125 inch wide fracture was 
discovered in the RH SRB aft skirt center BSM mounting base 
cover TPS. The fracture/ incision occurred at an angle of 
approximately 30 degrees to the SRB centerline and extended 
through the 0.5 inch thick cork closeout to the substrate. Soot 
deposits, erosion, heat effects, and discoloration were visible 
around the damage site. Twelve black and white particles, or 
flakes, were subsequently discovered inside the fracture! 
incision. Laboratory analysis determined the particles and 
flakes were high in silica content and are believed to be 
pieces of Orbiter lower surface tile. The analysis concluded 
the aft skirt cork damage was most likely caused by an impact 
from ascent debris containing Orbiter tile material. 
A detailed post landing inspection of OV-103 was conducted on 
9 December 1992. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 240 hits, 
of which 23 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The 
Orbiter lower surface had a total of 145 hits, of which 11 had 
a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on these 
numbers and comparison to statistics from previous missions of 
similar configuration, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris 
hits was greater than average and the number of hits one inch 
or larger was average. All three ET!Orbiter separation devices 
(EO-1, 2, and 3) and all ET/ORB umbilical separation ordnance 
retention shutters functioned properly. No flight hardware was 
found on the runway below the umbilicals when the ET doors were 
opened.	 - 
This flight marked the fifth use of the Orbiter drag chute. The 
drag chute appeared to have functioned nominally. All drag 
chute hardware was recovered and showed no signs of abnormal 
operation.
A variety of residuals were present in the Orbiter window 
samples and indicated sources such as Orbiter TPS, SRB BSM 
exhaust residue, natural landing site products, organics, 
paint, and "solder-type" residue (ground processing) . The L02 
umbilical door sample revealed only closeout residues and an 
unidentified "grease-like" residue. The sample from the SRB 
aft skirt TPS damage site exhibited indications of tile 
materials and an assortment of common elemental residues. This 
residual sampling data did not point to a single source of 
damaging debris as all of the materials have been documented 
previously in post-landing sample reports. The residual sample 
data also gave no indication of debris trends when compared to 
previous mission data.	 r 
A total of 8 Post Launch Anomalies, but no IFA candidates, 
were observed during the STS-53 mission assessment. 
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2.0 PEE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The Ice/Debris/TPS/Photographic Analysis Team briefing for 
launch activities was conducted on 1 December 1992 at 0800 
hours with the following key personnel present: 
S. Higginbotham NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
J. Cawby LSOC - SPC Supervisor, ET Processing 
R. Seale LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
M. Dean LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
W. Richards LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
Z. Byrna NASA - JSC Level II Integration 
S. Copsey MMC	 - MAE ET TPS Testing/Certif 
J. McClymonds RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVI II Integ 
K. Mayer RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
J. Cook MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing 
C. Cooper MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing 
S. Otto MMC	 - LSS ET Processing 
These personnel participated in various	 team activities, 
assisted	 in	 the collection	 and evaluation	 of	 data,	 and 
contributed to reports contained in this document.
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2.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PPD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 1 December 1992 from 0830 - 0930 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and LP-1 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-103 Discovery (15th flight), ET-49 
(LWT 42), and BI-055 SRB's. Documentary photographs were taken 
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload 
and launch, tygon tubes for hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and 
LD55 were installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. The tygon 
tubes are intended to remain in place during cryogenic loading 
and be removed by the Ice Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
There were no significant vehicle anomalies. At the time of the 
inspection, pad technicians were applying a K5NA repair to the 
aft skirt HDP #5 foot inner web stiffener. Total cure of the 
K5NA would not be complete prior to launch and an MRB approval 
was obtained. 
There were no significant vehicle or facility debris issues. 
Flat foil-like particulate collectors had been taped to the top 
of each.rainbird water deflector as part of an SRB plume study. 
The foil/tape was not a debris threat to the vehicle. 
Six HLP deck handrails were secured to I-beams and railings in 
the northwest corner of the FSS 95 foot level as part of a new 
plan to retain handrails on the MLP deck late in the countdown. 
The MLP deck and areas under the raised decks had not yet been 
vacuumed or swept to remove small debris items, such as sand, 
rust flakes, and paint chips. The work was accomplished prior 
to clearing the pad and no items were entered Appendix K of OMI 
S0007.
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Pre-flight configuration of the bipod jack pad closeouts, the 
intertank TPS acreage, and the LH2 tank flange closeout. 
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LH (-Y) vertical strut/cable tray TPS forward surface prior to 
cryogenic fuel loading. Cracks have appeared in this general 
area after cryoload due to the elimination of a stress relief 
gap as part of a manufacturing process enhancement change. 
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Flat, foil-like, particulate collectors had been taped to the 
top of each rainbird water deflector as part of an SRB plume 
study. The foil/tape was not a debris threat to the vehicle. 
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3.0 LAUNCH 
STS-53 was launched at 13:23:59.993 GMT (8:24 a.m. local) on 
2 December 1992. 
3.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 2 December 1992 from 0155 to 0400 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations 
with the exception of acreage ice/frost exceeding 0.0625 
inches. There were no conditions outside of the established 
data base. Ambient weather conditions at the time of. the Ice 
Inspection were: 
Temperature:	 46.4 Fahrenheit 
Relative Humidity:	 85.3 % 
Wind Speed:	 7.4 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 272 Degrees 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature 
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
3.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS 
thruster paper covers and water spray boiler plugs were intact. 
Ice/frost formations were present at the SSME #1 and #2 heat 
shield-to-nozzle interfaces. Condensate was present on all SSME
 
heat shields, but the base heat shield tiles were dry. An 
infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the 
base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields. GOX vapors 
originating from inside the SSME nozzles was reported to MPS 
engineers and determined to be an expected condition. 
3.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH 
SRB case temperatures as low as 46 degrees Fahrenheit (F) . In 
comparison, temperatures measured by a hand-held Minolta/Land 
Cyclops spot radiometer reached a low of 45 degrees F and the 
SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl) measured tempera-
tures as low as 51 degrees F. All measured temperatures were 
above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. 
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The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PT) supplied 
by MTI was 68 degrees F, which was within the required range of 
44-86 degrees F. 
3.4 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 2300 to 0824 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3. 
The program predicted condensate changing to ice/frost on the 
L02 tank barrel section and the upper LH2 tank TPS acreage 
surfaces during the coldest time of night (0400-0700 local). 
At the time of the Ice Inspection, condensate on the L02 tank 
barrel section +Y+Z quadrant was freezing and changing to ice 
with a frost covering. Visually, the ice thickness appeared to 
exceed the 1/16 inch allowed in the LCC. There was no ice or 
frost in the "no ice" regin. There were no TPS anomalies. The 
tumble valve cover was intact. The pressurization line and 
support ramps were in nominal configuration. SURFICE predicted 
temperatures of 33 degrees F on the ogive and 30 degrees F on 
the barrel. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the intertank. Generally, the 
acreage TPS was dry. Ice/frost accumulated in the stringer 
valleys at the LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank flanges. Typical 
ice/frost formations, but no unusual vapors, were present on 
the ET umbilical carrier plate. The portable STI measured 
intertank surface temperatures that averaged 49 degrees F. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. At the time of 
the Ice Inspection, condensate on the LH2 tank +Y+Z quadrant 
was freezing and changing to ice with a frost covering. 
Visually, the ice thickness appeared to exceed the 1/16 inch 
allowed in the LCC. Two sanded areas at XT-1250 and XT-1500 had 
a heavier coating of ice/frost due to the somewhat thinner TPS. 
Early in the inspection, the portable STI measured surface 
temperatures as low as 32 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 24 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. SURFICE predicted tempera-
tures of 25 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 32 degrees F,on 
the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, bipod jack pad 
closeouts, PAL ramp, cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps, 
longerons, thrust struts, manhole covers, or aft dome apex. 
Ice/frost had formed along the -Y bipod ramp closeout bondline. 
Two frost spots had formed on the -Y thrust strut -to- longeron 
interface. An ice/frost formation on the +Y longeron closeout 
was emitting vapors, but exhibited no offset. Some ice/frost 
was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper strut fairing 
expansion joints. Ice/frost covered the lower EB fittings 
outboard to the strut pin hole with condensate on the rest of 
the fitting. The struts were dry. 
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A crack that extended 2/3 the width of the -Y vertical strut 
cable tray was present in the forward surface TPS near the 
longeron closeout interface. Although jagged in appearance, the 
crack exhibited no offset and was not filled with ice or frost. 
The appearance of the crack was expected due to the elimination 
of the stress relief gap at the factory. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. In addition, frost covered some 
parts of the L02 feedline acreage. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. There were light accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of 
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge 
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks, and in the LH2 feedline bellows, was typical. The 
LH2 feedline straight section (spool) was also covered by 
ice/frost - a condition that is not expected unless the ambient 
temperature falls below 32 degrees F. 
Somewhat greater than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumu-
lated on the top, aft, and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB 
umbilical/purge barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed 
on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost was 
present on both the aft and forward outboard pyrotechnic 
canister closeout bondlines indicating thermal shorts. Some 
venting was occurring at the forward outboard location. The 
amount and location of the ice/frost was acceptable for launch 
per the NSTS-08303 criteria. A 2-inch ice/frost finger had 
formed on the cable tray vent hole. The 17-inch flapper valve 
actuator access port foam plug closeout exhibited a slight leak 
at the forward corner and was covered by ice/frost. No unusual 
vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable 
replenish, and launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles. 
Due to the concern of exceeding the 47 degree (F) ambient 
temperature limit as listed in the Launch Commit Criteria, the 
Ice Team took dry and wet bulb temperature measurements on the 
ML? deck and at most levels of the FSS. The measurements were 
reported to the Firing Room real-time for incorporation into 
the Air Force weather prediction -model and for comparison to 
other sources of local temperature data. 
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The summary of Ice/Frêst Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of nine OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented a crack in the forward surface TPS 
covering of the -Y vertical strut cable tray at the intersec-
tion to the ET/SRB cable tray transition fairing. The crack 
exhibited no offset and was not filled with ice or frost. The 
condition was acceptable for launch per NSTS-08303 and CR 
SO41254C. 
Anomaly 002 recorded ice accumulation on the +Y+Z quadrant 
acreage of both L02 and LH2 tanks. Ice Team observations deter-
mined the ice thickness exceeded 0.0625 inches, which was an 
LCC violation. Launch was delayed until ambient warming melted 
the ice/frost formations. A second on-pad visual inspection at 
0730 hours revealed ice/frost conditions were acceptable for 
launch. 
Anomaly 003 documented ice/frost formations on both +Y and -Y 
longeron closeout bondlines, in the thrust strut -to-longeron 
interface, and on a subsurface defect (+Y side only) . The ice 
and frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 004 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the intertank stringer valleys at both L02 tank and LH2 tank 
flange closeouts. The presence of the ice/frost was acceptable 
per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 005 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. The ice/frost 
formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 006 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost fingers on 
the L02 ET/ORB umbilical pyro canister purge vents. The ice and 
frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 007 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical pyro canister purge vents, purge 
barrier (baggie), plate gap purge vents, cable tray vent hole; 
LH2 feedline bellows; and LH2 recirculation line bellows and 
burst discs. The ice/frost formations were acceptable per 
NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 008 documented two small (less than 0.5 inch) icicles 
on the north GOX vent duct. With the prevailing wind out of the 
southwest at 229 degrees, no threat to Orbiter tiles existed. 
Anomaly 009 recorded ice/frost formations on the LH2 tank aft 
dome manhole covers. The condition was acceptable per NSTS-
08303.
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3.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB hoiddown post areas with the exception of a 
welder's cable found in the FSS 195 foot level restroom. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals.. Typical accumulations of ice/frost were present on 
the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. There was also no 
apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP. The GH2 
vent line modification prevented ice from forming. But some 
ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUCP legs 
and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. No icicles were present on the GOX 
vent ducts at the time of launch. 
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At the time of the Ice Inspection, condensate on the L02 tank 
barrel section +Y+Z quadrant was freezing and changing to ice 
with a frost covering. The ice thickness exceeded the 1/16 inch 
allowed in the LCC.
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The thicker TPS on the L02 tank ogive prevented ice or frost 
from forming in the "no ice" region. There were no anomalies on 
the L02 tank TPS.
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At the time of the Ice Inspection, condensate on the LH2 tank 
+Y+Z quadrant was freezing and changing to ice with a frost 
covering. The ice thickness exceeded the 1/16-inch allowed in 
the LCC.
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Ice/frost formed along the bondlines of the PAL ramp and some 
of the pressurization line/cable tray ramps. Ice/frost was also 
present in the L02 feedline upper bellows and support brackets. 
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tiost had formed on the LH2 tank ac.L .zage, in the L02 
feed line support brackets, and along the cable tray ramps 
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Ice/frost had formed on the lower LH2 tank TPS
wow 
 acreage, in the 
L02 feedline lower bellows and support brackets, and on some of 
the L02 feedline acreage areas.
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Ice/frost had formed on the lower LH2 tank TPS acreage and 
along the cable tray ramp bondline closeouts. An ice/frost 
formation on the +Y longeron closeout was emitting vapors, but 
exhibited no offset.
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There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. There 
were light accumulations of ice/frost on the TPS acreage areas 
and on the purge barrier (baggie). 
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Somewhat greater than usual amounts of ice/frost had formed on 
the top, aft, and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical/ 
purge barrier. Normal amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on 
the plate gap and pyrotechnic canister purge vents, and the LH2 
recirculation line bellows/burst disks. Ice was present on the 
forward outboard pyrotechnic canister closeout bondline 
indicating a thermal short (arrow) . Frost was beginning to form 
on the LH2 feedline straight section (spool). 
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Ice/frost continued to form and 'accumulate in the LH2 recir-
culation line bellows. By the end of the Ice Inspection, the 
LH2 feedline straight section (spool) was almost completely 
covered by ice/frost, a condition that should not occur until 
the ambient temperature falls below 32 degrees F. 
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Typical in size, ice/frost finger's had formed on the aft plate 
gap purge vent and LH2 umbilical cable tray vent hole. Some ice 
and frost had formed at the forward corner of the 17-inch 
flapper valve actuator access port TPS plug closeout indicating 
a small purge gas leak at the bondline. 
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS, and the pad acreage 
was conducted on 2 December 1992 from Launch + 1-3/4 to 3-1/2 
hours. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found with the 
exception of one Orbiter base heat shield Q-felt plug on the 
southwest pad apron slope. 
SRB hoiddown post erosion was less than normal. All south HDP 
shoe shim material was intact, but slightly debonded at the 
sidewalls of HDP #1, #2, #5, and #6. There was no visual 
indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south hoiddown 
posts. There were no ordnance fragments found in the south 
hoiddown post stud holes. All of the north HDP doghouse blast 
covers were in the closed position and exhibited typical 
erosion. The SRB aft skirt purge lines were in place, but 
slightly damaged. The SRB T-O umbilicals exhibited minor 
damage. 
The GOX vent arm, OAA, and TSM's showed only minor damage. The 
GH2 vent arm was latched on the seventh tooth of the latching 
mechanism and had no loose cables (static retract lanyard) . The 
GH2 vent line appeared to have retracted nominally, though the 
north latch had contacted the north saddle stabilizer. The 
damage from this contact was minimal and has occurred on previ-
ous launches. The GH2 vent line showed typical signs of SRB 
plume impingement. The ET intertank access structure also 
sustained typical plume heating effects. 
Damage to the facility included: 
1. A lighting fixture from the northeast corner of the FSS 
95 foot level was found on the north side of the same 
level beneath the stairs. 
2. An FSS 255 foot level sign was detached and found on 
the east side of the 255 foot level. 
3. The FSS 155 foot sign on the east wall of the elevator 
structure was loose. 
4. The OIS box door on the southwest corner of the FSS 
235 foot level was damaged. 
5. A UV Flame Detector was found on the northwest corner 
of the pad apron. 
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on 
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage. 
The six MLP deck handrails stowed on the northwest corner of 
the FSS 95 foot level for this launch were intact. However, 
further review of this plan has determined that all MLP deck 
handrails will normally be removed from the pad prior to 
launch. A back-up plan provides the option of securing hand 
rails on the FSS 95 foot level, if required. 
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An inspection of the beach from UCS-10 to Titan complex 40, the 
beach road, the railroad tracks, and the water areas around the 
pad and under the flight path was completed. No flight hardware 
was found. 
MLP-1 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of 
both TSM's, at the bottom of both SRB exhaust holes, and at the 
top of the SSME exhaust hole. All sensor readings were 
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits. 
Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation 
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of 
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles 
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 69 particles 
were imaged in the T+142..5 to 362.5 second time period. Fifteen 
of the particles were imaged by only one radar, 30 particles 
were imaged by two radars, and 24 particles were imaged by all 
three radars. The number and signal strength of the detected 
particles was comparable to the STS-52 mission (74 particles). 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
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Plume erosion of the south SRB holddown posts was typical. EPON 
shim material was intact but slightly debonded from the 
sidewalls of the hoiddown post shoes. 
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Deletion of aft skirt strain gauges resulted in less electrical 
connector sacrificial pieces on the SRB T-O umbilical exposed 
to the SRB plume.
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5.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were 
presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and 
vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in 
Section 9. 
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMEI 
A total of 102 film and video data items, which included 
thirty-eight videos, thirty-nine 16mm films, twenty-one 35mm 
films, and four 70mm films, were reviewed starting on launch 
day. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
Numerous camera views showed that ice accumulation on the 
Orbiter side of the External Tank had melted prior to the time 
of lift off. Ice/frost covered a substantial part of the ET -z 
side LH2 tank, but was not a concern for launch (OTV 033, 060, 
065, 066) 
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile 
appeared normal (RSS STI, C/S-2 STI, OTV 051, 063, 070) 
Orange vapor (burning hydrogen) was visible between the exit 
plane and the #9 hatband near the steer horn, or the coolant 
manifold, on the SS #2 nozzle -z side. This event is similar 
to the cold wall hydrogen leak observed during SS #2 ignition 
for STS-44 (E-5, 16, 20) 
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine 
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous 
launches (E-7.6, 77). 
A ribbon-shaped (approximately 12"xl") debris object originated 
from the joint between the raised deck and the inclined deck 
ramp and appeared to be pulled into the SSME exhaust hole by 
aspiration (E-12). 
At least three thin, dark pieces of debris, similar in 
appearance to scale off the MLP deck, entered the field-of-view 
from above and landed on the MLP deck west of the LH2 TSM 
without contacting the vehicle (E-3). 
SSME ignition vibration/ acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from five places on the base heat 
shield (E-17, 18, 20) and two places on the RH RCS stinger 
(E-19)
33
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice/frost to fall from 
the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. There were no unusual vapors or 
cryogenic drips from the ET/ORB umbilicals during tanking, 
stable replenish, ignition, or liftoff (OTV 009, 050, 054, 063, 
064) 
SSME ignition caused pieces of ice to shake loose from the L02 
feedline bellows and support brackets. The ice fell past the RH 
wing, but no contact was visible (OTV 054). Liftoff vibration 
caused approximately 12 pieces of ice/frost to shake loose from 
the L02 feedline forward bellows and support bracket. Several 
more pieces of ice fell aft from the same area before the 
vehicle cleared the tower (E-5, 6, 54). Ice in the bellows and 
support bracket is an accepted condition per the NSTS-08303 
criteria (E-65A). 
A metal parts tag, approximately 1.5"xO.75", originated from 
the aft edge of the L02 T-0 umbilical interface plate and fell 
aft past SSME #3 without contacting flight hardware (E-17, 
frame 2600; E-19, frames 3170-3350) 
A red, flexible object, approximately 8"x2" and similar to red 
vinyl tape, fell out of the L02 TSM door opening below the ECS 
ducts and was drawn into the SSME plume by aspiration (E-17, 
frames 2820-2940; E-19, frames 3403-3517) 
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and 
retracted properly (OTV 049, 063). Separation and disconnect of 
the GUCP from the External Tank was nominal (OTV 004). The GH2 
vent line retracted and latched normally with no rebound. Some 
slack in the static retract lanyard caused the cable to contact 
the edge of the platform, rebound upward, and contact the right 
GUCP leg (E-41, 42, 48, 50) 
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #1. The stud remained fully 
extended until clear of the aft skirt foot, twanged briefly, 
and then dropped into the ho].ddown post. One piece of ordnance 
debris (frangible nut web) dropped out of the DCS/stud hole and 
fell into the HDP haunch area. No contact with flight hardware 
was observed (E-9) . No ordnance debris fell from any of the 
other HDP DCS/stud holes. 
SRB thermal curtain tape was loose near HDP #4 prior to liftoff 
(E-1, 7, 15, 25) 
Light frost was present in the ET GOX vent louvers. There was 
no TPS damage to the ET nose cone acreage, footprint, or' 
fairing (OTV 013, 060, 061). ET "twang" was typical (E-79). 
Water vapor/condensate trailed from the split rudder speed 
brake drain hole after liftoff (E-34, 212). 
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Ice continued to fall aft from the ET/ORB umbilicals as the 
vehicle cleared the tower. One piece impacted the body flap 
half way between the hinge and the trailing edge, but no tile 
damage was visible (E-52). 
Numerous white flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent 
(E-54, 213) 
ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier (baggie) fell aft shortly after 
the roll maneuver (E-213, 222). 
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after comple-
tion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS 
thrusters and were pieces of RCS paper covers. Other pieces of 
RCS paper covers were visible passing over the Orbiter wings 
(E-213, 222) 
Frost melting and/or subliming on the -z side of the External 
Tank during ascent was visible as vapor trailing aft of the 
vehicle (E-223, 224) 
Debris entering the SSME plume during ascent caused orange 
flashes (E-212, 213, 222) 
Movement of the body flap was similar to previous flights 
(E-207, 212) 
Exhaust plume recirculation, SRB plume tailoff, and separation 
appeared nominal (E-207, 208, 223). Normal plume brightening 
and puffs of dark smoke occurred in the SRB plume prior to 
separation. Slag particles dropped out of the SRB plume before 
and after separation (TV-13). 
Frustum separation from the forward skirts and parachute 
deployment appeared normal. Nozzle severance debris was 
typical.
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Orange vapor (burning hydrogen) was visible between the exit 
plane and the #9 hatband near the steer horn, or the coolant 
manifold, on the SSME #2 nozzle -z side. This event may be 
indicative of a cold wall hydrogen leak. 
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A 1.5" x 0.75" metal parts tag and a red, flexible object 
similar to vinyl tape fell aft past SSME #3 without contacting 
flight hardware.
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A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #1. one piece ut u.Lkhiance debris fell from the DCS/stud hole into the HDP haunch area and may 
have been a frangible nut web.
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Water vapor/condensate trailed from the split rudder 
speed brake drain hole after liftoff 
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I Ice continued to fall aft from the ET/ORB umbilicals as the vehicle cleared the tower. One piece impacted the Orbiter body flap (arrows) , but no tile damage was visible. 
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew using hand held 
cameras. Seventy-two 35mm still photographs (36 with a 300 mm 
lens; 36 with a 600mm lens).
 were obtained of the ET after 
separation from the Orbiter. OV-103 was not equipped to carry 
umbilical cameras. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have been a safety of flight concern. 
ET structural separation from the Orbiter appeared nominal. The 
BSM burn scars on the L02 tank were typical. No anomalies were 
observed on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, PAL ramps, LH2 
tank, and aft hardpoint closeout. Four large and two small 
divots were visible in the aft dome spray abort. Plume recir-
culation and aft dome heating caused the usual charring of the 
NCFI. 
Three divots occurred in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange 
closeout (+Y+Z quadrant). One divot was visible in the -Y+Z 
quadrant flange closeout. 
Residual hydrogen was venting from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical - a 
phenomenon that has been observed on previous tanks. 
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ET structural separation from the Orbiter appeared nominal. No 
anomalies were observed on the nosecone, L02 tank acreage, and 
LH2 tank TPS acreage. Four divots were present in the LH2 tank-
to-intertank flange closeout.
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abort. Plume recirculation and aft dome heating caused the 
usual charring of the NOEl. Residual hydrogen was venting from 
the LH2 ET/ORS umbilical - a phenomenon that has been observed 
on previous tanks.
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5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 20 film and video data items, which included five 
videos, thirteen 16mm high speed films, and two 35mm large 
format films, were reviewed. 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (RAC) and 
final approach appeared nominal. The landing gear extended 
properly. Left and right main landing gear touchdown was almost 
simultaneous with the right side contacting the runway first. 
The drag chute was deployed just after breakover, but before 
the nose gear contacted the runway. Drag chute deployment 
appeared nominal. A slight crosswind caused the drag chute to 
move left of the Orbiter centerline. The chute risers appeared 
to contact tiles on the vertical stabilizer stinger. 
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. There were no 
anomalies during rollout. No tile damage was visible. 
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/]RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar 
to 1130 hours. From a debris 
excellent condition.
inspected for debris damage and 
AF on 5 December 1992 from 0830 
standpoint, both SRB's were in 
6.1 RE SOLID ROT BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The RH frustum had 16 MSA-2 debonds and one 1-inch diameter 
area of missing TPS between the +Y and -z axes at the 381 ring 
frame (Figure 4). Minor localized blistering of the Hypalon 
paint had occurred along the 395 ring. All BSM aero heatshield 
covers were locked in the fully opened position. 
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both 
RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact. Minor 
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the systems tunnel 
cover and around the ET/SRB attach point (Figure 5). No pins 
were missing from the frustum severance ring. The forward 
separation bolt and e].ectridal cables appeared to have 
separated cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the 
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting 
from severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
The upper strut fairing was missing a 7" x 3 11 , area of K5NA and 
the substrate was charred.. All three aft booster stiffener 
rings also appeared undamaged. The aft booster stiffener ring 
splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was 
missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. The 
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and 
aft fasteners had been eliminated. RTV-133 replaced the K5NA 
over the forward fasteners. One divot, measuring 4 inches in 
diameter, had occurred over fasteners on the aft skirt TPS near 
HDP #3. 
The HDP #1 stud hole was broached due to a stud hang-up. A 
10"x3" area of EPON shim was missing from HDP #3 (Figure 6). 
The material was lost prior to water impact (sooted/charred 
substrate). All Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were 
seated properly.
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The RH frustum had 1€ MSA-Z deUoiiW uveL tasLene.rs au I 
1-inch diameter area of missing TPS between the +Y and -Z axes 
at the 381 ring frame. All BSM aero heat shield covers were 
locked in the fully opened position. 
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The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Minor 
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the forward ET/SRB 
attach point. Both RSS antenna covers/TPS were intact and 
undamaged.
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1A 10"x3" area of EPON shim was missing from kIL1 #3. The
material was lost prior to water impact (sooted substrate) 
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6.2 LB SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LH frustum had 28 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Torn and 
missing MSA-2 (1-inch diameter) from one location between the 
+Y and +Z axes just aft of the 336 ring frame may have been the 
result of handling damage (Figure 7). There was minor localized 
blistering of the Hypalon paint. The BSM aero heat shield 
covers were locked in the fully opened position, though three 
of the four cover attach rings had been bent by parachute riser 
entanglement. 
The LB forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact, but 
delaminated. The forward separation bolt and electrical cables 
appeared to have separated cleanly. Three pins were missing 
from the frustum severance ring, a condition that reportedly 
was the result of parachute entanglement (Figure 8) . Minor 
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB attach 
point and on the systems tunnel cover. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS 
and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ETISRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
The upper strut fairing was missing two areas of K5NA (5" ' x 3" 
and 4" x 1") along the separation edge. The substrate was 
charred. Two aft booster stiffener rings sustained water impact 
damage. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact 
and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated in only 
localized areas. The K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the 
kick ring forward and aft fasteners had been eliminated. RTV-
133 replaced the K5NA over the forward fasteners. 
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were properly 
seated, though a frangible nut web was caught between the DCS 
debris plunger and the stud hole wall. The small K5NA repair on 
the inside of the HDP #5 foot, which was applied 24 hours prior 
to launch, was intact. None of the EPON shim material was lost 
prior to water impact (Figure 9). 
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The LH frustum had 28 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. The BSM 
aero heat shield covers were locked in the fully opened posi-
tion, though three of the four cover attach rings had been bent 
by parachute riser entanglement. 
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Three pins were missing from the ti'istuifl severance ring, a con-
dition that reportedly was the result of parachute entanglement 
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Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The upper 
strut fairing was missing two areas of K5NA (5"x3" and 4"xl") 
along the separation edge. The substrate was charred/sooted. 
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6.3 RECOVERED SRB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS) 
housings revealed an overall system retention of 99 percent and 
individual hoiddown post retention percentages as listed: 
% of Nut without
HDP # 2 large halves 
1 99 
2 99 
3 93 
4 99 
5 99 
6 99 
7 99 
8 99
% of Ordnance 
fragments % Overall 
94 99 
96 99 
96 94 
97 99 
93 99 
99 99 
96 99 
93 99
STS-53 was the twelfth flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the holddown post DCS's. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System, should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance 
debris. 
USBI Squawk 53-005 documented a 2.75 inch long (mild radius) by 
0.125 inch wide fracture in the P.R SRB aft skirt center BSM 
mounting base cover TPS. The fracture/ incision occurred at an 
angle of approximately 30 degrees to the SRB centerline and 
extended through the 0.5 inch thick cork closeout to the sub-
strate. Soot deposits, erosion, heat effects, and discoloration 
were visible around the damage site. Twelve black and white 
particles, or flakes, were subsequently discovered inside the fracture/incision. Laboratory analysis determined the particles 
and flakes were high in silica content and are believed to be 
pieces of Orbiter lower surface tile. The analysis (reference 
USBI Report M&P-3032-033-91 and DAC-103-92) concluded the aft 
skirt cork damage was most likely caused by an impact from 
ascent debris containing Orbiter tile material. 
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
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A fracture/ incision in the cork insulation on the RE SRB aft 
center BSM fairing contained black and white particles believed 
to be fragments from Orbiter lower surface tiles. The cork 
damage was most likely caused by an impact from ascent debris 
containing Orbiter tile material. 
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-103 (Discovery) was 
conducted on December 9-11, 1992, at the Ames-Dryden Flight 
Research Center (ADFRF) on Runway 22 and in the Mate/Demate 
Device (D). This inspection was performed to identify debris 
impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS 
sustained a total of 240 hits, of which 23 had a major 
dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not include 
the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME
 
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A 
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 36 previous 
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 
24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42 which had damage from known 
debris sources), indicates that the total number of hits was 
greater than average while the number of hits one inch or 
larger was average. Figures 10-13 show the TPS debris damage 
assessment for STS-53. 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 145 hits, of 
which 11 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The 
majority of the this damage occurred on the right side of the 
vehicle and is primarily attributed to ice from the L02 feed 
line. A cluster of 56 hits, with 2 greater than one inch, was 
observed forward and outboard of the L02 ET/Orbiter umbilical 
opening. Similar clusters have been observed on previous 
flights and are attributed to ice/debris impacts at ET 
separation. 
The tile material which was found embedded in the right hand 
SRB aft skirt Booster Separation Motor (BSM) mounting base 
cover TPS may have originated from tile V070-391016-551 located 
on the Orbiter forward right hand lower surface. The 1.8 by 
1.2 by 0.2 inch area of missing material from this tile 
includes some Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) tile iden-
tification markings (yellow-green dots). Tile coating material 
recovered from the BSM TPS was reported to exhibit OEM tile 
identification marking. No other missing tile material from the 
Orbiter forward lower surface included any OEM marking. 
Although there are no visible signs of any foreign material in 
the V070-391016-551 damage site, the size and shape of the 
damage is characteristic of an impact by a low density object, 
such as ET TPS foam. Samples of tile and adjacent gap filler 
material from this damage site and one other on the Orbiter 
forward right hand lower surface were taken by Rockwell TPS 
engineering for laboratory analysis at Downey (reference 
Figure 14 and Section 8.0).
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Figure 10. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
1.8 x 0.5 x 0.3 
1.2 x 0.5 x 0.1	
.• 
0	 5.0 x 2.5 x 0.3 
0 
.1 •. 
•0\ 
•	 \ 
U. 
us 
4 HITS <1 INCH 
	
2.2 x 1.5 x 0.7 -
	
• Leo •   
0
• 
	
1.2 x 0.9 x 0.4
	 0 
0.
4 HITS < 1 INC 
56 HITS WITH 
2	 1 INCH: 
1.4 x 0.5 x 0.3 
1.4 x 0.7 x 0.7 
1.7 x 1.7 x 0.7 
.
1.4 x 0.4 x 0.1 
0 
0
0 
• .
TOTAL HITS
	 145 
HITS>1INCH= 
ALL bMNStONS 
WI INCHES 
1.8 1.3 x 0.2 
3.5 x 2.0 x 0.6 
64
UREMENTS IN INCHES 
0.1 
tL HITS =	 12 
>1 INCH=
NASA-KSC	 11 DEC 1992 
TV-MSD-22
STS-53 
Figure 11. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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Figure 12. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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Figure 13. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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The following table breaks down the STS-53 Orbiter debris 
damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 11 145 
Upper surface 1 48 
Right side 0 5 
Left side 1 11 
Right OMS Pod 0 4 
Left OMS Pod 10 27 
TOTALS 23 240
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in excellent condition for a landing on a concrete 
runway. 
All three ET/Orbiter separation devices (EO-1,2, and 3) 
appeared to have functioned properly. The stop-bolts on the 
EO-1 separation assembly did not sustain any damage/bending. 
All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance retention shutters 
were closed properly. No flight hardware was found on the 
runway below the umbilicals when the ET doors were opened. 
The left wing Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panel #9 exhibited 
a 4 by 2.5 inch area of coating bubbling and spalling. Left 
wing RCC panel #6, right wing RCC panel #13, and left wing RCC 
T-seals #8, 14, and 16 all exhibited smaller areas of coating 
bubbling and spalling. 
Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical. Four Dome 
Mounted Heat Shield (DiS) closeout blanket sacrificial panels 
were nearly detached from the 1:30 to 4:30 o'clock position of 
SSME #2 exposing the inner blanket layer. This layer was 
eroded/missing in a number of places revealing the underlying 
batting material. The outer layer of the SS #1 DMHS splice at 
the 6 o'clock position exhibited minor fraying. All of the 
remaining DS blankets were in excellent condition. 
Some blue-tinted discoloration was visible on the SSME #2 
nozzle in the area where the cold wall fire was observed during 
post launch film review. Tiles on the trailing edge of the body 
flap immediately underneath SSME #2 were discolored (milky 
white) . This discoloration may have been a result of the nozzle 
fire. 
The tiles on the left OMS pod leading edge sustained more 
damage then usual. Access to this area was not available at 
Dryden, therefore the number of impact sites and dimensions 
shown in Figure 11 are approximate. The cause of this damage is 
still undetermined.
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Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited typical hazing and 
streaking. Only a very light haze was present on the other 
forward facing windows (#1, #2, #5, and #6). Surface wipes have 
been taken from windows #1 through #6 (and one other vehicle 
location as indicated in Figure 14) for laboratory analysis. A 
total of 33 hits with one greater than one inch were noted on 
the perimeter tiles around windows #1 through #6. Most all of 
these hits were small and shallow in depth and may have been 
caused by ATV used to bond paper covers to the FRCS nozzles, 
exhaust products from the SRB booster separation motors, 
ice/TPS debris from the External Tank L02 tank, or Orbiter TPS 
fragments (or any combination of the above) 
Runway 22 was inspected and swept by Air Force personnel on 
December 8, 1992 and all potentially damaging debris was 
removed. A post landing inspection of Runway 22 was performed 
immediately after landing. No unexpected flight hardware was 
found on the runway. 
This flight marked the fifth use of the Orbiter drag chute. The 
drag chute appeared to have functioned nominally. All drag 
chute hardware was recovered and showed no signs of abnormal 
operation (reference Figure 15 for recovery locations) . A tile 
on the lower (-Z) right hand edge of the drag chute compartment 
opening was slightly damaged by separation of the chute 
compartment door. Similar damage has been observed after every 
previous use of the drag chute. Two additional damage sites 
were observed on the vertical tail stinger, one on the lower 
surface and the other on the stinger trailing edge. This damage 
was most likely caused by contact with the chute riser lines 
during deployment. 
A Minolta/Land Cyclops infrared spot radiometer was. used to 
measure the surface temperatures on several areas of the 
Orbiter (per OF.SD V09AJO.095). Two hours twenty-seven minutes 
after landing, the Orbiter nosecap RCC was 105 degrees 
Fahrenheit (F) . Two hours twenty-seven minutes after landing, 
the right wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 73 degrees F and 
panel #17 was 72 degrees F (reference Figure 16). These 
measurements were taken much later than usual due to an FRCS 
oxidizer leak. 
In summary, the total number of STS-53 Orbiter TPS debris hits 
was greater than average while the number of hits one inch or 
larger was average when compared to previous missions 
(reference Figure 17-19). 
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
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Figure 14. CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS 
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Figure 16. TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS 
RCC PANEL 172Z 
TIME 1511 PST 
RCC PANEL 9 ..Z.	 OV-103 
TIME 1510 PST	
STS-53 
These measurements were 
taken much later than 
usual due to an oxidizer 
leak. All measurements 
were taken with a 
Minolta/Land Cyclops 
infrared spot radiometer. 
Target emissivity was 
assumed to be 1.0. 
NOSECAP 105° 
TIME	 1512 PSI 
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FIGURE 17: ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE 
HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS 
STS-6 15 80 36 120 
STS-8 3	 . 29 7 56 
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58 
STS-11 (41-B) 11 19 .	 34 63 
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36 
STS-14 (41-D) 10 44 30 111 
STS-17(41-G) 25 69 36 154 
STS-19 (51-A). 14 66 20 87 
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81 
STS-27 (51-I) 21. 96 33 141 
STS-28 (51 -J) 7 66 17 111 
STS-30 (61-A) 24 .	 129 34 183 
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257 
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193 
STS-29 18 100 23 132 
STS-28R 13 60 20 76 
STS-34 17 51 18	 . 53 
STS-33R 21 107 21 118 
STS-32R 13 111 15 120 
STS-36 17 61 19 81 
STS-31R 13 47 14 63 
STS-41 13 64 16 76 
STS-38 7 70 8 81 
STS-35 15 132 17 147 
STS-37 7	 . .	 91 10 113 
STS-39 14 217 16 238 
STS-40 23 153 25 197 
STS-43 24 122 25 131 
STS-48	 . 14 100 25 182 
STS-44 6 74 9 101 
STS-45 18 122 22 172 
STS-49 6 55	 . 11 114 
STS-50 28 141 45 184 
STS-46 11 186 22 236 
STS-47 3 48 11. 108 
STS-52 6 152 16 290 
AVERAGE 14.8 92.1 22.2 129.6 
SIGMA 77 470 11.0 61.6
MISSIONS STS-23, 24,25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES 
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The Orbiter lower surface tiles susLained a total of 14 hits 
of which 11 had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. The 
majority of the tile damage occurred on the right side of the 
vehicle and was attributed to ice from the L02 feedline. 
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Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical. Four SSME #2 
Dome Mounted Heat Shield closeout blanket sacrificial panels 
were nearly detached and the underlying batting material was 
exposed.
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Tiles on the left OMS pod leading edge sustained more damage 
than usual. The cause of this damage is still undetermined. 
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il I view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All sepai-atioH 
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was 
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was 
opened.
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ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was 
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was 
opened.
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8.0 DEBRIS SiPLE LB REPORTS 
A total of seven samples were obtained from OV-103 Discovery 
during the STS-53 post landing debris assessment (reference 
Figure 14) at Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility. The seven 
submitted samples consisted of 6 window wipes (Windows 1-6) and 
1 sample wipe from the L02 umbilical door lower surface. The 
samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis 
Branch (MAB) for material composition and comparison to known 
STS materials. Debris sample analysis involves the placing and 
correlating of particles with respect to composition, thermal 
(mission) effects,, and availability. Debris sample results and 
analyses are listed by Orbiter location, in the following 
summaries. In addition, a summary of the RH SRB aft skirt 
debris analysis is included in this section. 
Orbiter Windows 
Results of the window sample analysis revealed the presence of 
the following materials: 
1. Metallics 
2. RTV, silica-rich tile, insulation glass fibers 
3. Paints, primer, rust 
4. Organics 
5. Earth compounds 
Debris analysis provided the following correlations: 
1. Metallic particles (aluminum, zinc carbon and stainless 
steel alloys) are common to SRBIBSM exhaust residue, 
but are not considered to be a debris concern in this 
quantity (micrometer) and have not generated a known 
debris effect. Also noted was tin-lead, suspected to 
be a "solder-type" origin in ground processing. 
2. RTV, silica-rich tile, and insulation glass fibers 
originate from Orbiter thermal protection system (TPS). 
3. Paints and primer are of flight hardware/facility/GSE 
origin; rust is an SRB BSM exhaust residue. 
4. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method; final results are 
pending. Preliminary results are similar to those of 
STS-52 (included in this report). 
5. Earth compounds (alpha-quartz, muscovite, calcite, and 
salt components) originated from the landing site. 
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L02 Umbilical Door Lower Surface 
Results of the L02 umbilical door lower surface wipe sample 
indicated the presence of the following materials: 
1. Tile and insulation material 
2. Dense Silicon Carbide 
3. Paint and rust 
4. Earth compounds 
5. Organics 
Debris analysis provided the following correlations: 
1. Tile and insulation material originated from Orbiter 
thermal protection system (TPS) 
2. Dense Silicon Carbide has been evaluated by Orbiter TPS 
engineering and determined the origin to be OU coating 
of gap filler. This material is applied in liquid form 
to the exposed edge of gap filler for heat protection. 
3. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; 
rust is of SRB BSM exhaust origin 
4. Earth compounds (calcite and salt components) 
originated from the landing site 
5. Organics originated from umbilical closeouts; 
the grease-like material was found to be a hydrocarbon 
of as yet unidentified origin. 
Debris from RH SRB Aft Skirt TPS Incision 
During SRB post-flight assessment and recovery operations, 
debris was discovered in a damaged area on the RH aft skirt 
center BSM mounting base cover cork insulation. This debris was 
tested by the MSFC and Rockwell-Downey Materials and Processes 
laboratories.. Results indicated the presence of the following 
materials: 
1. Tile and tile coating 
2. Iron oxide/silica 
3. Cork insulation 
4. Trace inorganic elements 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Tile and tile coating material originated from Orbiter 
Thermal Protection System (TPS). The coating material 
exhibited a portion of the "dot" tile number printing. 
Post-flight inspection of OV-103 found lower surface 
tile damage with a "hit" that included a portion of the 
dot part number.
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2. Iron oxide/silica is probably RTV residue. 
3. Cork insulation was found mingled with tile particles, 
the cork insulation originated from the SRB aft skirt. 
4. Trace inorganic elements (silica, aluminum, phosphorus, 
zinc, sulfur, chlorine, potassium, calcium, titanium, 
antimony, and iron) were noted in particles from the 
sample. These elements are not unusual to the known 
Shuttle program process compounds, but did not directly 
match a specific material. 
STS-52 Organic Analysis 
Results of the STS-52 Organic Analysis revealed the presence of 
the following materials: 
1. Polymeric 
2. Rubbery 
3. Fibrous 
4. Proteinaceous 
Debris analysis provided the following correlations: 
1. Polymeric materials included items with styrene-
acrylonitrile, polyethylene terephthalate, aromatic 
polyamide, and cellulosic characteristics. This 
variety is similar to that observed in STS-47 samples 
and appear to originate from Orbiter window protective 
covers. 
2. Rubbery materials were found to be methyl silicone, as 
in red RTV, and a calcium carbonate filled adhesive/ 
sealant most likely from the window protective covers. 
3. Fibrous material detected in this sampling set were 
cellulosic in nature and probably of sample cloth 
origin. 
4. Proteinaceous (amide characteristics) material found 
were of possible insect origin. 
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Conclusions 
The STS-53 mission sustained Orbiter tile damage to a greater 
than average degree. However, the chemical analysis results 
from post flight samples did not point to a single source of 
damaging debris. 
Orbiter window samples showed evidence of SRB BSM exhaust, 
Orbiter TPS, landing site products, organics, paint, and the 
presence of "solder-type" material (from ground processing) 
The L02 umbilical sample indicated the presence of silicon 
carbide, a new finding for the last mission report (STS-52), 
but can now be identified as gap filler coating. 
The variety of residuals attributed to known sources did not 
seem to change significantly when compared to previous sample 
data (reference Figure 20). The results of this analysis are 
similar to that of previous missions in that new entries do not 
appear to be related to .a debris problem. 
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9.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris ihspections and film/video review, 8 Post 
Launch Anomalies, but no IFA candidates, were observed on the 
STS-53 mission. 
9.1 LAUNCH PAD/FACILITY 
1. A metal parts tag, approximately 1.5"xO.75", originated from 
the aft edge of the L02 T-O umbilical interface plate and fell 
aft past SS #3 without contacting flight hardware. 
2. A red, flexible object, approximately 8"x2" and similar to 
red vinyl tape, fell out of the L02 TSM door opening below the 
ECS ducts and was drawn into the SSME plume by aspiration. 
9.2 EXTERNAL TAN 
1. The 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam plug 
closeout exhibited a slight leak at the forward corner and was 
covered by ice/frost. 
2. On-orbit photography of the ET after separation revealed 
three divots in the aft dome spray abort. Three divots occurred 
in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout (-Y+Z quadrant). 
9.3 SOLID ROT BOOSTERS 
1. A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #1. The stud remained fully 
extended until clear of the aft skirt foot, twanged briefly, 
and then dropped into the hoiddown post. 
2. The RH frustum had 16 MSA-2 debonds and one 1-inch diameter 
area of missing TPS between the +Y and -z axes at the 381 ring 
frame. The LH frustum had 28 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Torn 
and missing MSA-2 (1-inch diameter) from one location between 
the +Y and +Z axes just aft of the 336 ring frame may have been 
the result of handling damage. 
3. A 10 11x3" area of EPON shim was missing from liD? #3. The 
material was lost prior to water impact (sooted/charred 
substrate). 
9.4 ORBITER 
1. Orange vapor (burning hydrogen)-was visible between the exit 
plane and the #9 hatband near the steer horn, or the coolant 
manifold, on the SSTY #2 nozzle -z side. This event is similar 
to the cold wall hydrogen leak observed during SSME #2 ignition 
for STS-44.
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Lockheed 
ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE PROGRAM 
2400 NASA Road 1P.O.Box58561,Houston,Texas77258(713)333-5411
January 22, 1992 
Greg Katnik 
MCiTV-MSD-22 
OSB Room 5203R 
KSC, Florida 32899 
Dear Greg, 
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-53 Final Report, and was completed 
January 20, 1992. Publication numbers are LESC-30617 and JSC-25994-53. The actual 
document can be obtained through the LESC library/333-6594 or Christine Dailey /483-5336 
of the NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project.
' Christine Dailey,	 is r 
Image Analysis Section 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
2.1	 Debris 
2.1.1	 Debris Near the Time of SSME Ignition 
2.1.1.1	 Debris from the ET L02 Feedline Upper Bellows 
(Cameras OTV-054, E-5, E-6, E-25, E-54, E-65A, E-77, E-79) 
Multiple light colored pieces of debris, probably ice, were first noted above the ET/Orbiter 
umbilical disconnects and then fell aft along the vehicle prior to liftoff. The debris originated 
from the ET L02 feedline upper bellows. Debris falling aft from above the ET/Orbiter umbilical 
disconnects has been observed on previous missions. None of the debris appeared to strike the 
vehicle. 
Figure 2.1.1.1	 Light Colored Debris Falling Aft along South Side of ET 
Figure 2.1.1.1 shows multiple white pieces of debris, probably ice, falling aft toward the MLP to 
the right of the Orbiter's centerline. 
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2.1.1.2	 White Debris From the ET/Orbiter Umbilicals 
(Cameras OTV-009, OTV-049, OTV-059, OTV-063, E-1, E4, E-5, E-6, 
E-14, E-16, E-18, E-19, E-25, E-30, E-34, E-36, E-52, E-65, E-77) 
Multiple pieces of white debris, probably ice, were seen falling from the ET/Orbiter umbilical 
area and fall aft along the body flap. One piece of debris may have contacted the aft edge of the 
bodyflap. Ice debris was seen to strike the lower edge of the umbilical door at 337:13:23:56.587 
UTC. No damage to the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV) was detected. More than usual ice build 
up was noted on the 17 inch and 4 inch lines at the flanges and around the umbilical baggie 
material. No follow up analysis has been requested. 
2.1.1.3	 White Debris From the ET/SRB Aft Attach Points 
(Cameras E-1, E-4, E-57) 
White debris, probably ice, originated from the north side of the ET/RSRB and the ET/LSRB aft 
attach struts and fell aft prior to and during liftoff. No further photographic analysis has been 
requested. 
Figure 2.1.1.3	 White Debris from the North Side of the ET SRB Aft Attach Struts 
Figure 2.1.1.3 shows the white debris falling from the north side of the RSRB/ET aft attach strut. 
The debris falls aft and south between the SRBs but did not appear to strike the SLy. 
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2.1.1.4	 Debris Between the SRBs 
(Camera E-5) 
Multiple pieces of small light colored debris were first seen between the SRBs and fell toward 
the MLP and bodyflap after SSME startup. This debris may have originated from the ET/SRB 
aft attach points. None of the debris appeared to strike the SLY. No follow up analysis has been 
requested. 
2.1.1.5	 Debris From L02 TSM Umbilical Disconnect Area 
(Cameras E-17, E-19) 
A single red rectangular shaped piece of debris fell aft from the L02 TSM feed line area prior to 
liftoff. A single, light colored, rectangular piece of debris first noted in the L02 TSM carrier 
plate area fell aft prior to liftoff. No further photographic analysis has been requested. 
Figure 2.1.1.5	 Debris from the L02 TSM Carrier Plate 
Figure 2.1.1.5 shows a red paper like piece of debris falling aft below the L02 TSM. Also 
shown in this figure is TPS erosion of the base heat shield near SSME #3. 
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2.1.2	 Debris Near the Time of SRB Ignition 
2.1.2.1	 Holddown Post Debris 
(Cameras E-8, E-9) 
A single dark, curved piece of debris was seen at the time of the bolt release at HDP #M- 1 
(camera E-9). This piece of debris fell on to the hoiddown post shoe and then into the RSRB 
flame duct. No further photographic analysis has been requested. 
Figure 2.1.2.1	 Debris First Seen Near the Hoiddown Post Area 
Figure 2.1.2.1 shows a piece of debris falling from the HDP #M-1 area. This debris seen 
between the pyrotechnic initiation controller (PlC) wires was first seen as the bolt released from 
the DCS hole. 
A single dark piece of debris was seen near the debris containment system (DCS) area of HDP 
#M-2 (camera E-8) at liftoff. 
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2.1.2.2	 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7) 
(Cameras E-5, E-25) 
A fast moving circular piece of debris was noted traveling outward from the RSRB flame trough 
towards the L02 TSM. 
The trajectory of the debris was digitized on a Film Motion Analyzer using film from camera E-
25. The object was also seen in the camera E-5 film but only the last stages of its trajectory were 
visible. In the camera E-5 film, the object appeared to be circular. The two dimensional (parallel 
to the image plane) velocity of this debris was calculated to be 66.5 feet per second. The velocity 
represents a minimum since the motion into or out of the optical axis could not be determined. 
None of the debris appeared to strike the orbiter. Appendix D Task #7 contains the detailed 
analysis including a plot of the debris trajectory as a function of time. 
2.13	 Debris After Liftoff 
Multiple pieces of debris fell aft of the SLY after liftoff. The debris falling away from the 
vehicle during the STS-53 ascent was similar to that seen on previous mission film and video 
views. 
2.1.3.1	 Light Colored Debris in Exhaust Plume During Ascent 
(Camera KTV4A) 
A light colored piece of debris was first seen near the left side of the vehicle exhaust plume at 
approximately 72.4 seconds mission elapsed time (MET). The debris traveled to the right across 
the field of view. This debris was only seen on KTV-4A. The origin of the debris could not be 
determined. No follow up analysis has been requested. This debris was only seen on KTV-4A. 
The origin of the debris could not be determined. 
2.1.3.2	 Debris in Exhaust Plume Prior to SRB Separation 
(Cameras ET-208, E-208) 
A small piece of debris was noted below the SRB exhaust plume at approximately 122.6 seconds 
MET and then fell aft. A second light colored piece of debris was seen above the SRB exhaust 
plume at approximately 122.8 seconds MET. The origin of this debris could not be determined. 
Debris observed during this time period have been observed on previous missions. No follow up 
analysis has been requested. 
2.1.3.3	 Debris in Exhaust Plume After SRB Separation 
(Cameras ET-208, E-208) 
Multiple light colored pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the vehicle after SRB separation. 
The debris was first seen in the SRB exhaust plume and appeared to originate from the SRBs. 
Debris in the SRB exhaust plumes after SRB separation have been observed on previous 
missions. No follow up analysis has been requested. 
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2.1.4	 Debris Strike of RSRB Aft BSM Triple Motor Housing (Task #11) 
(Cameras E-2, E-5, E-6, E-8, E-9, E-16, E-25, E-52, E-54, E-65A, E-79A, 
E-205, E-207, E-211, E-213, E-220, E-222, E-223, E-224) 
An elliptical scar was noted on the RSRB aft BSM triple motor housing during post recovery 
inspection. The elliptical scar showed evidence of contact with a Thermal Protection System 
(TPS) tile. The damaged motor cover was over the center of the triple motors (separate from the 
fourth motor). The damage was 3" long x 0.5" deep and very narrow. The damaged area was 
sent to two separate laboratories for independent analysis (USBI and MSFC). Chemical analysis 
showed that the scar had a high silicon content. A quarter inch piece of debris was found 
imbedded in the crack. The recovered debris appeared to have original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) tile identification markings. The only missing tile material from the Orbiter's lower 
surface with these markings was located on the Orbiter forward right hand lower surface. The 
Photo/TV Analysis Project was asked to review all of the STS-53 films in which the RSRB was 
visible. The results are given in Appendix D Task #11.
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Figure 2.1.4a	 Elliptical Debris Strike on the RSRB Aft BSM Triple Motor Housing 
Figure 2.1.4a shows an elliptical debris strike on the RSRB aft BSM triple motor housing. The 
figure is aligned so that the aft end of the RSRB is toward the bottom of the frame (arrow). The 
scar is aligned from the upper left toward the lower right of the frame. 
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Figure 2.1.4b	 RSRB Aft BSM Triple Motor Housing without Protective Insulation 
Figure 2.1.4b is aligned in the same manner as Figure 2.1.4a with the aft end the of the RSRB 
toward the bottom of the frame. The protective insulation had been removed and sent to two 
independent :ihnratrit	 The elliptical scar is not visible in this view. 
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Figure 2.1.4c Close Up View of RSRB Aft Triple Motor Housing 
Figure 2.1.4c shows a close up view of the area of interest. The alignment of the (linear feature) 
is the same as Figure 2.1.4a. The dark metallic scar at the bottom of the frame is the same as the 
dark metallic scar seen in Figure 2.1.4b (arrow). The green area below the linear feature is 
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thought to be a result of the scarring during ascent. The piece of debris recovered from the 
analysis is not shown in any of the 2.1.4 figures. 
2.2	 MLP Events 
2.2.1	 Holddown Post #M-1 Bolt Hangup (Task #12) 
(Camera E-9) 
A holddown bolt hangup was noted at HDP #M-1. The bolt retracted after the vehicle cleared 
the length of the bolt. No further photographic analysis has been requested. The bolt released 
from the RSRB and retracted to its normal position after extending 9.4 inches above the shoe 
(Appendix D Task #12). 
Figure 2.2.1 Holddown Post #M-1 Bolt Hangup 
Figure 2.2.1 shows the HDP #M- 1 bolt is still contained within the RSRB DCS area after liftoff. 
HDP bolt hang-ups have occurred on previous missions. To date, the bolt hangup on STS-53 has 
not been declared an IFA. 
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2.2.2	 Orange Vapor at SSME Startup Above the SSME #2 Rim 
(Cameras E-5, E-16, E-18, E-20) 
Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was first seen on the north side between the rim 
and the #9 hatband of SSME #2 at 13:23:56.181 UTC and continued through LOV after liftoff. 
The vapor appeared to originate from a point source rather than a large general area. Unlike the 
orange vapor observed on previous missions which lasts only a fraction of a second, this event 
occurred throughout SSME ignition and startup. Photographic still views of the orange vapor 
seen above the rim of SSME # 2 were reviewed with the MER manager. No follow up analysis 
has been requested. 
Figure 2.2.2 Vapor Above the Rim of SSME #2 
Figure 2.2.2 shows that the orange vapor appears to be a point source rather than generalized free 
burning hydrogen that surrounds the SSME bells. The orange vapor is located on the 
northwestern portion of SSME #2. The vapor appeared to be isolated and unique to the SSME 
#2 bell. 
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2.2.3	 Orange Vapor at SSME Startup (Cameras OTV-063, OTV-070, OTV-071, E-19, E-36, E-77) 
Orange vapor, possibly free burning hydrogen, was noted near the SSMEs just prior to SSMIE 
ignition. The view from OTV-063 showed this vapor moving north under the body flap 
(possibly due to winds from the southwest). Similar orange vapors have been observed on 
previous missions. No further photographic analysis has been requested. 
Figure 2.2.3	 Orange Vapor Under the Body Flap at SSME Ignition 
Figure 2.2.3 shows an orange vapor under the bodyflap. The general orange vapor is possibly 
free burning hydrogen observed at SSME ignition. 
2.2.4	 Slack in the GH2 Vent Arm Lanyard
(Camera E42) 
Slack in the gaseous hydrogen (GH2) vent arm lanyard was noted during latchback. The lanyard 
contacted the fixed service structure (FSS) and rebounded to contact the vent arm. Otherwise, 
the vent arm appeared to latch normally. No further photographic analysis has been requested. 
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2.2.5	 Loose Thermal Curtain Tape on the RSRB 
(Cameras E-7, E-14, E-15, E-25) 
A piece of loose thermal curtain tape was seen on the RSRB aft skirt near HDP #M-4 at liftoff. 
Loose SRB thermal curtain tape has been seen on previous mission films. No follow up analysis 
has been requested. 
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2.3	 Ascent Events 
2.3.1	 Vapor from Drain Hole in Trailing Edge of The Rudder Speed Brake 
(Cameras E-34, E-40, E-52, E-222) 
Vapor was noted coming from the drain hole on the aft edge of the rudder/speed brake prior to 
and during liftoff. No further photographic analysis has been requested. 
2.3.2	 Vapor Near the LH2 Umbilical 17 inch Line 
(Cameras E-34, E-40) 
Vapor was noted near the LH2 17 inch line after liftoff. Normally, ice and vapor events 
originating from this area occur at SSME startup and conclude prior to liftoff. No further 
analysis has been requested. 
Figure 2.3.2	 Vapor from ET/Orbiter Umbilical Areas After Liftoff 
Figure 2.3.2 shows vapor from the ET/Orbiter umbilical area after liftoff. Vapor from the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals after liftoff is rare but is not considered anomalous due to the cool 
temperature at liftoff. 
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2.3.3	 Vapor from the -Z side of the ET 
(Cameras E-207, E-211, E-223, E-224) 
Vapor was noted to drift from the bottom (-Z side) of the ET after the roll maneuver. The source 
of the vapor is probably the frost noted on the north side of the ET prior to liftoff. No further 
photographic analysis has been requested. 
Figure 2.3.3	 Vapor from -Z side of ET after Liftoff 
Figure 2.3.3 shows the vapor originating from the -Z side (north side of the ET at liftoff) of the 
ET. The source of the vapor is probably the frost observed from this area prior to liftoff. This 
vapor is not considered an anomaly. 
2.3.4	 Recirculation (Task #1) 
(Cameras ET-207 and E-207) 
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB separation 
has been seen on nearly all previous missions. For STS-53, the start of recirculation was 
observed to be about 96 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 104 seconds MET 
STS-53 Final Report	
107
•t.. 
lHOTOGRApH
2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
on camera E-207. This was not a particularly good mission to view recirculation due to the high 
inclination and the clouds/haze at the time recirculation is generally observed. Appendix D Task 
#1 contains a summary of recirculation start and stop times for all missions since reflight. 
CAMERA 
E-207
START (seconds ME) 
96
STOP (seconds MET) 
104 
ET-207 98 --
NOTE:	 Due to the launch angle and the intermittent loss of vehicle (LOV) due to cloud cover, only

cameras ET-207 and E-207 observed a portion of the recirculation event. 
2.3.5	 Body Flap Motion (Task #4) 
(Cameras E-207, E-212) 
Films from cameras E-207 and E-212 were re-screened for a subjective measure of the amount of 
body flap motion visible. A preliminary analysis indicated the presence of slight body flap 
motion on both cameras. The 400" lens used on E-212 did allow a reasonably good view of the 
left side of the body flap; however, the atmospheric haze and soft focus hampered the selection 
of points. E-207 showed the right edge of the body flap but was acquired with a 180" lens 
(thereby reducing the size of the body flap within the field of view). The small amount of 
detectable motion on this view made it a poor candidate for quantitative analysis. Also, both 
views were rendered nearly useless beyond the first few seconds after roll maneuver due to the 
cloud cover. 
A sequence of frames on E-212 that showed the left side of the body flap was selected for 
analysis. Data was acquired from approximately 18 to 26 seconds MET. Once this data was 
corrected for camera jitter and viewing angle changes, the magnitude of the noise within these 
measurements exceeded the magnitude of the bodyflap movement. The cause for the noise in the 
data was mainly due to the low confidence in the selection of points that define edges on the 
body flap, and the low confidence was caused by the atmospheric haze and soft focus. 
A film-to-video conversion was performed on the E-207 and E-212 films for the last three OV-
103 missions that were launched at a 570 inclination angle: STS-42, STS-48 and STS-53. A 
review of each of the films as well as a re-screening of the digital video was conducted to 
determine whether or not the motion seen was significant. Most of the previous body flap 
motion studies were performed within the maximum dynamic pressure (Max-Q) region which 
runs from about 30 to 80 seconds MET. Cloud cover on the STS-53 views after about 28 
seconds MET made such a comparison impossible. 
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2.3.6	 Orange Hashes in the SRB Plume Prior to SRB Separation 
(Camera E-207) 
Multiple orange flashes were noted in the SRB exhaust plume aft of the vehicle during plume 
brightening prior to SRB separation. These flashes have occurred on previous Space Shuttle 
missions. No further photographic analysis has been requested. 
Figure 2.3.6	 Flashes in Exhaust Plume Prior to SRB Separation 
Figure 2.3.6 shows an orange flash in the exhaust plume prior to SRB separation (arrow). This 
event was discussed with MSFC personnel who had seen this event on previous flights. 
2.4	 DTO-0312 Analysis (Task #6) 
(Magazines STS-53-19 and STS-53-27) 
Magazine 19 contained thirty six good quality frames (views) of the external tank taken with a 
Nikon F4 and a 300 mm lens. The exposure was excellent. ET separation occurred 
approximately 8:54 MET (13:32:54 UTC). The first picture was acquired at approximately 05 
minutes and 32 seconds after ET separation (13:38:26 UTC). The last frame (frame 36) was 
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taken at approximately 8 minutes and 34 seconds after ET separation (13:41:28 UTC). Magazine 
27 contained thirty six excellent quality photographs taken with a second Nikon F4 body and the 
same a 300 mm lens plus an additional the 2X extender. The first frame of the second magazine 
(roll 27) was taken at approximately 10 minutes and 39 seconds after ET separation (13:43:33 
UTC). The last frame was taken at approximately 12 minutes after ET separation (13:44:54 
UTC). Overall, the external tank appeared to be in good condition. The normal ET aft dome 
TPS charring and SRB separation burn scars were observed. Venting from the LH2 umbilical 
disconnect was observed from frame 53-19-05 through 53-19-18. Two divots were noted on the 
LH2 intertank interface to the left of the bipod. Three divots were seen on the ET aft dome. 
Two of the divots were on the -Z side and one was on the +Z side of the external tank (53-19-
03).
-Li 
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53-019-034 
Figure 2.4a View of ET with 300 mm Focal Length 
Figure 2.4a shows the left side of the ET, the ET/Orbiter aft attach struts and forward bipod are 
visible in the FOV. This photograph was taken with the 300 mm focal length lens. 
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Figure 2.4b View of ET with 300 mm Focal Length Lens with a 2x Extender 
Figure 2.4b shows the ET with and effective 600 mm focal length lens. This photograph was 
taken approximately five minutes after the photograph in Figure 2.4a. This is the first time the 
long focal length lens has been used in conjunction with DTO-0312. 
2.5	 Landing Events 
2.5.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3) 
2.5.1.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film
(Camera E-1008) 
Camera E- 1008 film was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. The right outboard 
tire was used to scale the measurements. Data was gathered from approximately 1 second prior 
to landing through touchdown. Six points on every other frame over a period of 100 frames were 
digitized. These points consisted of the top and bottom of the rudder speed brake, the top and 
bottom of the right tire and a point on the top and bottom of the runway immediately beneath the 
wheel. The raw data was corrected for the vertical change in scale at each frame. The distance 
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between the top of the wheel and the runway surface was computed. A linear regression was 
applied to the normalized vertical distance versus time data to find the sink rate. The sink rate 
was determined to be 3.4 feet/second which is within the current threshold limits. 
Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 17 seconds after main gear touchdown. Camera 
E-1008 was used to determine the nose gear sink rate. The nose wheel itself was used to scale 
the measurements.Data was gathered for approximately 0.87 second prior to nose gear 
touchdown. A full second was not used because the control point could not be seen for more 
than 86 frames. Three points on every other frame over this period were digitized. These points 
consisted of the top and bottom of the nose wheel and a control point near the edge of the 
runway. The distance between the bottom of the wheel and the control point was computed and 
a linear regression was applied in the same manner as the main gear sink rate. This rate was 
determined to be 1 feet/second which is also well within the current threshold limits. 
Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Appendix D Task #3. 
2.5.1.2	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video 
(Cameras DTV-1, DTV-3) 
Cameras DTV- 1 and DTV-3 were used to determine sink rate for nose gear and main gear 
respectively. Data was gathered from approximately 1 second prior to landing through 
touchdown. Points from thirty-five consecutive video frames from D1V- 1 and forty consecutive 
video frames from DTV-3 were digitized. The following points were digitized for nose gear sink 
rate: top of speed brake, bottom of speed brake, center of nose gear and the runway directly 
below the nose gear. For the main gear sink rate the following points were digitized: top of 
speed brake, bottom of speed brake, center of right main gear, the runway directly below the 
right main gear, center of the left main gear and the runway directly below the left main gear. 
The height of the speed brake was used as the scale to determine the actual height of the landing 
gears above the runway. The sink rate was determined to be 5.4 feet per second for the nose gear 
and 5.6 feet per second for the right and 6.1 feet per second for the left main gear. 
Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Appendix D Task #3. 
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2.5.2	 Drag Chute Performance Analysis (Task #9) 
(Cameras E-1005, E-1008 and E-1031) 
The landing of Discovery at the end of mission STS-53 marked the fifth deployment of the 
orbiter drag chute. The drag chute initiated 13.981 seconds after main gear touchdown. The 
drag chute was first measured to be at a heading angle of -7 degrees and a riser angle of +2 
degrees. The riser angle changed over a period of 4 seconds from the original +2 degrees to a 
riser angle of -2 degrees. After disreefing, the drag chute moved further to the vehicle's left side. 
The heading angle oscillated, having a minimum of -11 degrees before eventually returning to a 
maximum of +3 degrees. The riser angle had a maximum of +1 degree and a minimum of -10 
degrees during the oscillation. The maximum drag chute deflection along the vehicle's y-axis 
was approximately 21 feet (6.4 meters). The drag chute was released 38.605 seconds after 
touchdown. At drag chute release, the heading angle was approximately -i-0.5 degrees and the 
riser angle was approximately -3.5 degrees. All heading and riser angle measurements are 
relative to the orbiter's x-axis. 
Graphical representation of the data described may be found in Appendix D Task #9. 
Figure 2.5.2	 Drag Chute Deflection 
Figure 2.5.2 shows a view of drag chute at maximum deflection after disreefing and prior to 
chute release. 
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2.5.3	 Post Landing Video Inspection 
(Camera Walkdown Video) 
2.5.3.1	 Nitrogen Tetroxide Leak 
A reddish brown stain was seen above the F1L forward thruster port. No further photographic 
analysis has been requested. 
Figure 2.5.3.1	 Nitrogen Tetroxide Leak Leaves Discoloration on Orbiter 
Figure 2.5.3.1 shows the forward reaction control system (RCS) thrusters. A slight reddish 
brown stain was seen above and to the right of this port (arrow). This event was noted while still 
in flight. 
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2.5.3.2	 Impact Damage 
The post landing debris inspection was conducted by KSC personnel at the mate/demate facility 
at Dryden Space Center. Two hundred forty hits to the Orbiter TPS were identified of which 23 
had major axis greater than one inch as documented on the December 11, 1992, Debris Assement 
Report. One hundred forty-five of the two hundred forty strikes were on the Orbiter's lower 
surface and 11 of these were greater than one inch. No further photographic analysis has been 
requested. 
Figure 2.5.3.2a	 Damage to Lower Surface of the Orbiter TPS 
Figure 2.5.3.2a shows examples of minor damage to the underside of the Orbiter's TPS. The 
damage to the TPS is monitored and mapped after every mission by the KSC debris team. None 
of the debris strikes observed during the vehicle inspection appeared anomalous. 
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Figure 2.5.3.2b	 Scarring to the Vertical Stabilizer Stinger 
Figure 2.5.3.2b shows two light colored scars to the vertical stabilizer stinger. The location of 
these scars is near the drag chute door. 
STS-53 Final Report 	
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events 
2.5.3.3	 Tear of the Dome Mounted Heat Shield 
Damage to the dome mounted heat shield (DM1-IS) at the two to four o'clock position on SSME 
#2 was visible. Similar tears have occurred on previous missions. No further photographic 
analysis has been requested. 
Figure 2.5.3.3	 Tear in the DMHS on SSME #2 
Figure 2.5.3.3 shows a tear in the DM1-IS on SSME #M-2. The tear can be seen in about the 3 
o'clock position relative to the top of the frame. All of the DMHS appeared normal during the 
launch film screening. 
2.6	 Other Events 
Other normal events observed include: ice debris and vapor from the ET/Orbiter umbilical 
disconnects at SSME startup through liftoff; slight vapor from the L02 vent on the ET, flashes in 
the SSME plume prior to liftoff; motion of left wing/elevons, the vertical stabilizer, and the body 
flap between SSME ignition and liftoff; base heat shield erosion during SSME startup; MLP J-
pipe water leaks; ice and vapor from both TSM umbilicals at liftoff; debris in the exhaust cloud 
at the pad after liftoff; RCS paper debris prior to and after liftoff; ET aft dome outgassing and 
vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff; charring of the ET aft dome during ascent; debris 
in the SSME exhaust plume from liftoff through the roll maneuver; flares in the SSME exhaust 
plume after the roll maneuver; expansion waves; linear optical distortion; condensation around 
the SLV during ascent; dark puff in SRB plume prior to plume brightening; slag debris in the 
SRB exhaust plume during and after SRB separation. 
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I.	 INTRODUCTION 
Space Shuttle Mission STS-53, the flight of the Orbiter 
Discovery was conducted December 2, 1992 at approximately 7:24 
A.M. Central Standard Time from Launch Complex 39A (LC-39A), 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive photographic and 
video coverage was provided and has been evaluated to determine 
proper operation of the ground and flight hardware. Cameras 
(video and cine) providing this coverage are located on the fixed 
service structure (FSS), mobile launch platform (MLP), LC-39A 
perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and downrange tracking 
sites. 
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES: 
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis 
objectives for STS-53 included, but were not limited to the 
following.
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for 
anomaly detection 
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems 
c. Determination of SRB PlC firing time and SRB 
separation time 
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
integrity 
e. Correct operation of the following: 
1. Holddown post blast covers 
2. SSME ignition 
3. LH2 and L02 17" disconnects 
4. GH2 umbilical 
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals 
6. Free hydrogen ignitors 
7. Vehicle clearances 
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back 
9. Vehicle motion 
There was one special test objective for this mission. 
a. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation 
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT: 
Film was received from fifty-two of fifty-five requested 
cameras as well as video from twenty-three of twenty-four 
requested cameras. The following table illustrates the camera 
data received at MSFC for STS-53. 
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CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-53 
16mm 3 5m Video 
MLP 22 0 4 
FSS 6 0 2 
Perimeter 3 3 6 
Tracking 0 16 11 
Onboard 2 0 0
Totals	 33	 19	 23 
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is 
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments 
of the video products received at MSFC. 
a. Ground Camera Coverage: 
Photographic coverage of STS-53 was considered good. 
Coverage from some tracking cameras was limited due to cloud 
coverage. Camera E-35 did not run due to a mechanical problem. 
Video camera OTV-009 was not received at MSFC due to a local 
communications problem. 
Timing was not recorded, at MSFC, on several of the launch 
playback videos. This failure occurs frequently and is an 
operational error. 
b. Onboard Camera Assessment: 
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the 
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly, with 
the exception that neither camera recorded water impact. The 
astronauts carried two 35mm hand-held cameras, one of which had a 
2X extender to record film for evaluating the ET TPS integrity 
after ET separation. These films will be reviewed at a later 
date due to delays caused by this being an classified DOD 
mission. Upon request, information from these films will be 
available. 
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS: 
a. General Observations: 
While viewing the film, several events were noted which 
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and 
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the 
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SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnects and umbilicals; 
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, 
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detectors and 
purge barrier material. 
b. Loose Thermal Curtain Tape: 
Figure one is a frame of film from camera E-7. This figure 
shows one large piece of loose thermal curtain tape on the right 
SRB.
c. Holddown Post M-1 Stud Hand Up: 
Figure two is a frame of film taken from camera E-9 showing 
holddown post N-i stud hang up. The shoe lifts with the vehicle 
as it rises. The stud remains fully extended until the SRB aft 
skirt clears the post then falls into the bold catcher. 
d. Flame Noted on SSME #2: 
Figures three and four are frames of film from cameras E-16 
and E-18 showing a flame that was noted on the nozzle of SSME #2 
originating at the #2 fuel line at or near the steerhorn. The 
flame first appeared as the number two engine reached mainstage 
and continued to burn as the vehicle left the field of view. The 
flame is thought to be a result of possible leak in the #2 
steerhorn.
e. RSRB BSM Motor Cover Damage: 
Post-flight inspection of the RSRB aft BSN motor cover 
showed a debris impact approximately 3 inches long and 0.5 inches 
deep with fragments of Orbiter tile. A re-review of films was 
performed with emphasis being placed on the aft BSM motor cover. 
This review showed no evidence of a debris impact. Film coverage 
of the BSM motor is considered good through the roll maneuver. 
However, after the roll maneuver, film coverage may be inadequate 
to record such a debris impact. 
V.	 ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS: 
a. T-Zero Times: 
T-Zero times were determined from cameras which view the 
SRB hoiddown posts numbers M-1, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras 
record the explosive bolt combustion products. 
POST	 CAMERA POSITION
M-1 E-9 
M-2 E-8 
M-5 E-12 
M-6 E-13
TIME (UTC) 
337:13:24:00.003 
337:13:24:00.002 
337:13:24:00.001 
337:13:24:00.002 
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b. ET Tip Deflection: 
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined 
to be approximately 31.2 inches. Figure five is a data plot 
showing the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal 
and vertical directions. These data were derived from camera 
E-79.
c. SRB Separation Time: 
SRB separation time for STS-52 was determined to be 
337:13:26:06.40 UTC taken from camera E-207. 
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Figure 1
Loose Piece of Thermal Curtain Tape 
Figure 2
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH Hoiddown Post M-1 Stud Hang Up 
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Figure 3 
Flame Noted on SSMF #7. Camera F 16 
Figure 4	 COLOR PHOTOGRAPH 
Flame Noted on SSME #2, Camera E-18 
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Appendix C. Rockwell Photographic Analysis Summary 
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Space Transportation Systems Division
RockwelUnternatlonal Corporation 
12214 Lakewood Boulevard
Downey, California 90241 
January 26, 1993
oi% 
Rockwell 
International 
In Reply Refer to 93MA0068 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA) 
Contract NAS948500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell 
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-53 Mission. 
The System Integration Contractor hereby submits the Engineering. 
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle 
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document 
(NSTS 0844). 
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated 
to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) 
providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39A Fixed Service 
Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and 
uprange and downrange tracking sites for the STS-53 launch conducted on 
December 2, 1992, at approximately 5:24 AM (PST) from the Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC) and for the landing on December 9, 1992 at Edwards Airforce Base 
(12:44 PM PST). 
Rockwell received launch films from 83 cameras (59 cine, 24 video) and landing 
films from 16 cameras (10 cine, 6 video) to support the STS-53 photographic 
evaluation effort. One film, E-35 was not available due to camera malfunction. 
All ground camera coverage for this mission including coverage on the MLP, 
FSS and tracking cameras were good. 
Overall, the films showed STS-53 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from 
the ET/ORB umbilicals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to 
the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual 
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB 
stiffener rings and dissipated after the completion of the roll maneuver. Vapor 
was observed originating from the drain hole on the aft edge of the rudder/speed 
brake at liftoff. Charring of the ET aft dome and recirculation and brightening of 
the SRB plumes were visible and normal. Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing 
and SRB separation also appeared to be normal. 
(Packing Sheet No. DM93-07904) 
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A disturbance in the lateral acceleration strip chart data at liftoff led Rockwell 
Engineers (Ascent Separation Systems) to suspect there had been a bolt hang-up 
on one of the SRB hoiddown support posts. This assumption was confirmed 
when film E-9 was reviewed which clearly showed the post M-1 bolt to hang-up at 
liftoff: The bolt also deflected during liftoff until the aft skirt foot rose sufficiently 
to release it, causing the bolt to spring back to its original vertical position. 
Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge 
water was activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were 
activated at approximately 1 second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal.
All blast deflection shields closed prior to direct SRB exhaust plume 
impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and retracted as designed. The ET 
GH2 vent line carrier dropped normally and latched securely with no rebound. 
No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical hydrogen 
dispersal system hardware. 
STS-53 was the twelfth flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB holddown 
support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The link is designed to 
increase the plunger velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving the holddown 
bolt ejection velocity unchanged. This prevents frangible nut fragments and/or 
NSI cartridges from falling from the DCS, while not increasing the probability of 
a hoiddown bolt hang-up. However, during the review of the holddown post 
films for this mission, a single piece of (dark) debris was observed originating 
from the DCS area at liftoff. 
Significant events that were observed include a bolt hang-up at holddown post 
Ml at liftoff and the orange vapor at the #9 hat band on SSME #2 which may 
indicate a leak in that area. Also, a potential problem was discovered during the 
post SRB recovery inspection, when Orbiter tile fragments were found embedded 
in the right hand aft BSM cover. This resulted in launch films, that showed the 
right hand SRB aft skirt area, being re-screened for assessment of potential 
Orbiter tile damage and Orbiter re-entry risk. These events and other events 
noted by the Rockwell Elm/video users during the review and analysis of the 
STS-53 photographic items are summarized in the following comments. These 
events are not considered to be a constraint to next flight. 
COMMENTS 
1. A hangup of the hoiddown post M-1 holddown bolt on the right SRB was seen 
at liftoff on camera E-9. Rockwell/Downey engineers had previously 
reported a disturbance in the lateral acceleration strip chart data at liftoff 
which led them to expect a possible holddown post bolt hangup. This event 
was clearly seen in the photographic review as the M-1 holddown bolt rose a 
significant amount during liftoff before breaking away from the SRB and 
springing back into position. Bolt hangups have occurred on previous 
flights since return to flight. No further analysis is planned. 
2. On cameras E-5 and E6, E-20 an orange vapor (burning hydrogen) was 
visible between the exit plane and the #9 hat band near the nozzle steer horn 
on SSME #2. This event is similar to the hydrogen leak observed during 
SSME #2 ignition for STS-44 and is probably a nozzle cold wall tube leak. 
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The engine is currently scheduled to be removed the first week of February' 
for leak checks by Rocketdyne at KSC. No follow-up action is planned. 
3. The post SRB recovery inspection of the right SRB revealed damage (thin 
"crescents shaped "gash" approximately 3 in. x 1/8 in. x 1/2 in. deep) to the 
cork TPS material on the right-hand aft cover of the center BSM. The 
damaged site TPS material was removed and sent to United Space Booster, 
Incorporated (USBI) for laboratory analysis. The analysis indicated the 
debris was dark gray to black with three faint, light green circular dots and 
white fibrous material on the opposite side. The green dots are consistent 
with Orbiter Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) identification 
markings. The chemical content was predominantly silica, indicating 
Orbiter TPS tile material. Based on this analysis, on December 8th at 
16:15 PST, the evening before the STS-53 landing, the debris assessment 
teams at JSC, MSFC, KSC and RI Downey were activated in order to locate 
the source of the debris. The launch films that showed the RSRB aft skirt 
area were re-screened for indications of debris that may have been related to 
the Orbiter tile fragments found embedded in the right-hand aft BSM cover. 
The source that caused the BSM cover damage could not be determined from 
the launch films. However, the Rockwell team created a briefing which 
described the problem, the material analysis identifying the debris as 
Orbiter tile material, past history regarding re-entry heating on damaged 
TPS, the zone from which the tile fragments could have come, the critical 
components underneath the damaged area, and Rockwells' assessment of 
the re-entry risk. This briefing was presented to the NASA Management 
Council at 6 AM on December 9. Their decision was to continue the flight 
with the re-entry as planned. 
The subsequent post-flight inspection of OV-1 03 showed the type of damage 
that the Rockwell team had predicted, with no apparent damage to the 
underlying aluminum skin material. No follow-up photographic analysis 
has been requested. 
4. On camera E-8 a single dark piece of debris was seen near the DCS area of 
hoiddown post M-2 at liftoff. No further analysis is planned. 
5. Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen below SSME's just 
prior to SSME ignition on cameras OTV-070, OTV-071, E-19, E-36, E-77 and 
beneath the body flap (moving north) on camera OTV-063. This vapor 
appears to be similar to the vapor noted on previous missions. It is not an 
issue and no follow-up action is planned. 
6. On camera E-7, E-15 and E-25, a piece of loose thermal curtain tape was 
noted on the right SRB aft skirt near hoiddown post M-4 prior to liftoff. Loose 
thermal curtain tape has been seen on previous missions. No follow-up 
action is planned. 
7. Vapor was observed trailing from the drain hole on the aft edge of the 
rudder/speed brake after liftoff on cameras E-34, E-40 and E-52. Vapor from 
the drain hole on the rudder/speed brake has been seen on previous 
missions. No follow-up action is planned. 
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8. On cameras OTV-009, E-1, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-14, E-16, E-18, E-25, E-30, E-34, 
E-36, E-65 and E-77, multiple pieces of white debris (probably ice) were seen 
failing from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals at SSME ignition. Several of these 
particles contacted the lower edge of the umbilical door, but no damage was 
detected. No follow-up analysis is planned. 
9. Multiple pieces of ice/frost were seen filling from the ET L02 feedline 
forward bellows and support bracket area at liftoff on camera E-54. None of 
the debris appeared to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action is planned. 
10. On cameras E-17 and E-19, a light colored, rectangular piece of debris was 
noted in the L02 TSM carrier plate area falling aft prior to liftoff. Also, a 
red, rectangular piece of debris was seen falling aft from the L02 TSM feed 
line area prior to liftoff. No follow-up action is planned. 
11. On camera E-62, four dark debris objects (probably SRB throat plug RTV) 
appeared to be moving north out of the SRB flame trench. This debris did not 
appear to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action is planned. 
11 Flares and flashes seen in the SSME exhaust plume (E-54, E-207, E-213) 
during ascent. These observations have been seen in the SSME plumes on 
previous missions and are understood to be burning of propellant impurities 
including RCS paper covers. No follow-up action is planned. 
U On cameras E-207 and E-223, dark puffs were noted in the SRB plume at 
approximately 114 seconds MET (prior to plume brightening). Dark puffs 
have been seen on previous missions and no follow-up action is planned. 
14. The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed 
on STS-53. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for 
information only. 
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area. 
• Debris (Pad, insta-foam, water trough) in the hoiddown post areas 
and MLP. 
• Butcher paper falling from the RCS. 
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV 
prior to SRB separation. 
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME start-up. 
• Debris pieces in the SSME/SRB plumes. 
• ET aft dome outgassing and charring. 
• Slight elevon motion at SSME ignition. 
• Twang motion. 
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure (MAX-Q) 
region which appeared to have an amplitude and frequency similar to 
those of previous missions. 
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or ambient 
meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during ascent. 
• Slag in SRB plume after separation. 
• Condensation around the SLV during ascent. 
• Vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff. 
134
93MA0068 
Page 5 
15. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010 
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent 
clearance separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET 
vent umbilical structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety. 
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances 
between the left SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films 
showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies 
were observed for the SRB body trajectory. 
16. Cameras E7-16 and E27-E28 - OMRSD File 1X Vol. 5, Requirement No. 
DV08P.020 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to 
verify nozzle to hoiddown post drift clearance. 
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No 
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive 
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the holddown posts were verified. 
17. The landing of STS-53 occurred on the hard surface runway 22 at Edwards 
Air Force Base. Good video and film coverage were obtained and no 
anomalous events were observed. This flight marked the fifth use of the 
Orbiter drag chute. The drag parachute system performed as expected. All 
sequenced events occurred as expected and no hardware anomalies were 
observed. The drag chute appeared to drift to the left of the Orbiter center 
line as the vehicle slows down. 
Analysis continues in the areas of compartment door trajectory, reeledmain 
chute operation, and riser position relative to the Orbiter stinger. The 
results of this analysis will be used to validate models against actual flight 
data, and to allow accurate predictions for future flights. 
This letter is of particular interest to W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and J. M. Stearns (WE3) at JSC. The Integration Contractor contact is R Ramon at (310) 922-3679. 
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 
Space Systems Division 
i!olfel 
Chief Engineer 
System Integration 
RR:cl
135
•	 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Appiovod 
l'ubIit lI . ji.,Il.ii.J liiil.ltli liii	 llii	 .11,, I.i,il iii 0.,tiii is ,sliifl.ilt'd to sveio . je	 I hour 'it, lesfitIlise.Iudlnq the tune br luviewlIi1 ,ii,Ii u. hulls.
	 r..ruhuiuiJu . .usiuriq Oats bi)UI(i?S. u)Jtt)l?Iluii	 aiuJ u,I.,lIiI.IIillllij II,,: data i i ',' led,	 id iüuiupl.ii:iq	 lid	 evlewulIg the uollechuon of IflICj(Ifltl0fl.•oi
 Si,lud (i)iTlmtIit, rt' .JJiihuliiI IFIlS Uuuuii1 iuturil.lte or	 fly ,)hlieh uspei.t LII tills uilillflnallujti	 flu luh;ij Su.jyeshiiuos liii i,du..iii,j ill) burden
	 10 M11 11 1"91001•Iesdquarlr.s Services. Ulrecli,rsIe (or I Oil fujI 1)11 l Iner ,lIl,,ils	 nut R.-I­ lb. 	 Ill S
 )ehlrrsoo U­ ., io.;. A	 ..	 u.	 A112W- .1 101	 .0 to mO Office	 I M..nu.qeme.l and 1100)01. P..perwoi k ltdu.tio,u I10J0s 1(0/04-UI fl y ).	 I IC iU0 J. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY
	 bL1iik) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVEHEL) 
January 1993 Final	 1-11 December 1992 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE S. FUNDING NUMBERS '
Debrjs/Jce/TPS Assessment and Integrated Photographic 
Analysis of Shuttle Mission STS-53
	 - 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Gregory N.
	 Katnik	 - 
Scott A.
	 Higginbotham	 - 
J._ Bradley_Davis  
7. PERFORMING ORGANILA1ION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) H. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
NASA REPORT NUMBER	 - 
External	 Tank Mechanical	 Systems Division 
Mail	 Code:	 TV-MSD-22	
- TM 107556 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
32899  
9. SPONSORING/ MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING /MONITOUING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 	 - 
12a. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Publicly Available 
Unclassified — Unlimited
	 - 
13. ABSTRACT (Maithnust 200 woids) 
A Debris/Ice/TPS assessment and integrated photographic analysis was 
conducted for Shuttle Mission STS-53. •Debris inspections of the flight 
elements and launch pad were performed before and after launch.
	 Ice/Frost 
conditions on the External Tank were assessed by the use of computer 
programs, nomographs, and infrared scanner data during cryogenic loading 
of the vehicle followed by on-pad visual
	 inspection.	 High speed photography 
was analyzed after launch to identify 'ice/debris sources and evaluate 
potential	 vehicle damage and/or in-flight anomalies. This report documents 
the debris/ice/TPS conditions and integrated photographic analysis of 
Shuttle Mission STS-53, and the resulting effect on the Space Shuttle Program. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
STS-53	 Ice	 Frost	 Debris CODE 
Thermal	 Protection System (TPS)
	 Photographic Analysis 
Il.	 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION III.	 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19.	 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION 01 ABSTRACT 
OF REPORT OF IRIS PAGE	 . - OF ABSTRACT 
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited
NSN 140-0 1 .')(UliU	 St.hIIdhld iurfyi h)) (1I y 2)9) 
1 36	 -	 Iiu-i null.-, I Ily A14%1 'uhf /Illy lit) 
NASA - MSFC 
ED35/D. Andrews 
EE31/M. A. Pessin 
EP55/T. J. Rieckhoff 
SA32/J. G. Cavalaris 
SA31/G. C. Ladner
Marshall Space Flight 
Center 
Huntsville, AL 35812 
Rockwell - Downey 
AC07/J. McClymonds 
FA44/R. Ramon
Rockwell International 
12214 Lakewood Blvd 
Downey, CA 90241 
KSC DEBRIS/ICE/TPS ASSESSMENT AND INTEGRATED PHOTOGRAPHIC

ANALYSIS REPORT DISTRIBUTION LIST 6/92 
NASA KSC 
MK/B. Shaw 
TV-PEO-2/P. Weber 
TV-MSD-1/C. Stevenson 
TV-MSD-2/L. Bolton 
TV-MSD-22/G. Katnik (9) 
TE-CID-2/C. Brown 
TE-CID-21A/N. Pope 
RO/R. E. Reyes 
MK-SIO-2/C. Martin 
NASA - HQ 
QSO/W. Corner
GK-5/Z. H. Byrns 
SK/F. Huneidi 
ZK-88/K. J. Mayer 
LSO-178/H. L. Lamberth 
LSO-437/J. Cawby 
USBI-LSS/L. Clark 
BICO-1/R. B. Hoover 
NASA - JSC	 Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
VA/D. Germany 
WE3/G. I. Good 
ES3/J. Kowal 
SN3/E. Christiansen 
SN5/D. E. Pitts 
Martin Marietta	 13800 Old Gentilly Road 
New Orleans, Louisiana 
Dept. 3571/S. Copsey	 70129 
Dept. 3570/C. Gray 	 P. 0. Box 29304 
New Orleans, Louisiana 
70189
